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ABSTRACT
Behavioral genetics and other “hard” sciences have the potential to wield great persuasive
power in both the criminal and civil court systems. Scholars have suggested that
testimony citing scientific evidence, regardless of the quality of that evidence, may be
given undeserved credibility and unduly influence on jurors and judges. These worries
reflect popular acceptance of biological determinism, the belief that all human behaviors
can be explained or predicted by examining an individual’s genes or brain. In this study,
we surveyed state trial court judges in the United States about their views on civil
responsibility for behavior in tort litigation, and specifically the responsibility of a man
who experienced auditory hallucinations and delusions that resulted in a car accident.
This study is the first to explore judges’ views on tort liability in the presence or absence
of evidence for genetic attribution. State trial court judges (n=465) were randomly chosen
from a publicly available list of seated judges nationwide, and randomly assigned surveys
detailing scenarios that varied in severity of behavior presented (battery versus
negligence) and in whether or not there was evidence that the man’s illness might have a
genetic component. Judges were asked to determine the legal responsibility of the
defendant and related questions including their perceptions of: the defendant’s
dangerousness to the public and level of control over his behavior; the causes of his
mental health condition; the defendant’s overall capability to take legal action in various
spheres of life. Over half of all judges found the defendant civilly responsible for battery
(51.8%) or negligence (67.5%). In the negligence scenario, over half (56.1%) of the
judges considered the defendant’s illness a biological disorder qualifying as a physical
disability. The presence of genetic evidence did not significantly impact any key survey

questions relating to responsibility. In the future, evidence of genetic attribution and
chemical or structural changes to the brain may support the redefinition of schizophrenia
as a physical disability. This could result in major changes in policy regarding the
standards for responsibility for behavior in negligence cases involving individuals with
schizophrenia, however, the presence of genetic evidence in the vignette was not
associated with these views. This study provides insight into judges' perspectives on
psychiatric genetic evidence in civil court and serves as groundwork for future studies
examining how genetic evidence will be used in court.
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INTRODUCTION
An Introduction to Civil Court, Tort Law, and Behavioral Genetic Evidence
While criminal law focuses on crimes and punishments, civil law focuses on private
rights. A tort is a civil wrong that causes harm to another party by violating a protected right
(Gossman, 2019). Tort liability is meant to monetarily reimburse the tort victim for the harm
endured, paid for by the tortfeasor, the one committing the tort (Gossman, 2019). Two types of
torts are intentional and negligence torts. Intentional torts (e.g. battery) are defined as any
unlawful physical violence or constraint without consent (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2014).
Negligence torts are defined as an action or a failure to act when a “reasonable person” would do
so (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2014).
Although behavioral genetics has been increasingly used in cases of medical negligence
and toxic torts, it has received only little attention in tort cases more generally (Sabatello, M.,
2016). However, given the attraction to such information in other judicial proceedings, it is
plausible that behavioral genetics will play a growing role in tort cases as the knowledge of
behavioral genetics develops. In criminal justice, for instance, studies of cases from 1994 to 2011
found that behavioral genetics has been introduced in some capacity in 81 cases (Denno, 2011).
Genetics and other “hard” sciences have great potential persuasive power in both the criminal and
civil court system (Jones, 2003). Current studies indicate that testimonies citing scientific
evidence, regardless of the quality of that evidence, may be viewed with “undeserved credibility”
and have a significant influence on jurors’ and judges’ decisions (Sabatello, 2016). These issues
illustrate the concept of biological determinism, the belief that an individual’s genes or brain
determine, and thus can allow us to predict or explain their behavior (Aspinwall, 2012). The
purpose of this study was to gain the perspective of judges’ views on civil responsibility in two
scenarios: battery and negligence. This study is the first to explore judges’ views on tort liability
in the presence or absence of schizophrenia genetic evidence.

An Historical Perspective on Mental Illness in Court
There are a variety of factors in court cases that determine what level of responsibility
defendants have for their actions, including one’s mental stability. In criminal law, a well-known
defense that has transformed over time is the insanity defense, which is based on the idea that
mental illness can prevent an individual’s ability to form “mens rea”, the intent to commit an act
and have a desired consequence, as required by the law (Feuerstein et al., 2005). The insanity
defense has been a part of English law since 1616, yet has remained largely unsuccessful as an
exculpatory argument. Over a century after its introduction, in the civil case of Polmatier v. Russ
(1988), the court spoke to the question of whether or not an insane person can be civilly liable for
intentional tort. However, contrary to the criminal law arena, the Supreme Court of Connecticut
held that the defendant could be held liable even though his behaviors that resulted in the death of
another person were based on delusions and he was incapable of informing the intent necessary
for responsibility. The defendant was thus found to be liable for his behavior. Although the
insanity defense applies solely in criminal law, this case was significant as it explored the
relationship between defendants’ mental instability and civil liability.
Similarly, the case of Breunig v. American Family Insurance Company (1970) focused on
torts of a person with a mental illness. The plaintiff was a truck driver who was injured in a car
accident caused by the defendant’s delusions while driving. A psychiatrist determined that the
defendant experienced an acute schizophrenic reaction of which she had no knowledge. During
the case, it was argued that it is unjust to hold a person responsible for their conduct if their
incapacity was unknown to them prior to the event and therefore could not have been avoided.
However, in determining the judicial perspective on tort liability, the court resolved that mental
incapacity does not protect individuals from liability for negligence and that culpability may stem
from ignoring known risks.

With the rise of genetic testing and sequencing in the 1990s, the possibility of utilizing
such knowledge in court has further expanded. In particular, genetic testing for the monoamine
oxidase A gene (MAO-A), known in the media as the “warrior gene”, has began to be introduced
to challenge the sentencing and mens rea of defendants in criminal cases. Low expression of
MAO-A has been linked to aggressive and violent behavior in observational and survey-based
studies (McDermott et al., 2009). In the case of Mobley v. The State (1995), the defendant was
convicted of murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a crime, where he ultimately robbed and murdered a student. Part of Mobley’s
argument against the death penalty was a family history of behavioral disorders and low
expression of MAO-A. Although this attempt to use behavioral genetic evidence in court was
unsuccessful, cases like this paved the way for other defendants to investigate how behavioral
genetic evidence could reduce responsibility or punishment in the United States and
internationally.
In an effort to “isolate” the potential impact of behavioral genetics on judicial decisions
in cases of criminal responsibility, a 2012 survey of 181 United States state trial judges presented
them with a hypothetical case of a defendant diagnosed with psychopathy, alternating offering
and not offering specific details on his low MAO-A activity and atypical amygdala function
(Aspinwall, 2012). This diagnosis resulted in an overall reduced punishment from the judges
surveyed, lessening the sentence from 13.93 years to 12.83 years (Aspinwall, 2012).

Features of Schizophrenia
Researchers have proposed that psychotic illness is better characterized as a continuous
spectrum, rather than a categorical classification, and includes what we refer to as schizophrenia
(Kapur et al., 2012 and Kendler et al., 2014). Schizophrenia affects about one percent of the
population (Insel, 2010). The onset of schizophrenia generally occurs in late adolescence or early

adulthood, with a peak between ages 18 and 25 (Insel, 2010). Symptoms of schizophrenia,
however, are often observed and reported at much earlier ages (e. g., delayed developmental
milestones, reduced IQ) during the period when the prefrontal cortex is still developing.
However, researchers have limited understanding of this developmental process (Insel, 2010 and
Brody, 2014).
Effective treatment and the means of preventing schizophrenia are lacking (Insel, 2010).
Some antipsychotic drugs aim to increase the amount of dopamine in the synapses to help relieve
the individual of some of the most characteristic symptoms, including hallucinations and
delusions (Leemput et al., 2016). Yet, one study found that less than 14% of individuals maintain
recovery during the first five years after a psychotic episode (Insel, 2010). Researchers in the
biomedical field had held out hopes of a more straightforward etiology, searching for one single,
potentially preventable cause for this disorder, but in decades of extensive research this has not
proven to be the case (Kendler et. al., 2015).

Current Understanding of the Genetic Contribution to Schizophrenia
Genetic attribution for schizophrenia was a concept first suggested by members of the
eugenics movement (Torrey, 2009). In 1916, Ernst Rüdin hypothesized a two-locus recessive
model, which was disproved. Though a clear etiology for schizophrenia has not been established,
mental illness has been observed to run in families (Uher and Zwicker, 2017). The genetic
contribution to schizophrenia is relatively unspecified, but researchers agree that there is often an
underlying genetic cause that appears to be multifactorial (GHR, 2019). A full assessment of its
multifactorial nature takes into account shared genetic risk factors, environment, geneenvironment

interactions,

neural

substrates,

neurobiological

measures,

biomarkers,

temperamental antecedents, cognitive and emotional processing abnormalities, comorbidities, and
illness course (Tandon, 2013).

Genes implicated in increased risk of schizophrenia are expressed throughout
development, including early in pregnancy (Susser et al., 1996 and Huckins et al., 2019). In
addition, studies suggest that parental age is a risk factor for schizophrenia. One study conducted
by Dolores Malaspina (2001) observed the relationship between paternal age and their offspring’s
likelihood of admission to psychiatric units after being diagnosed with schizophrenia. Compared
to those with fathers under 25 years old, the relative risk of schizophrenia increased in each 5year age group, rising more steeply in ages 45-49 (2.02) and 50 and older (2.96). These findings
supported the hypothesis that paternal age is a significant predictor of schizophrenia diagnoses
(but not of other psychiatric diagnoses) and suggest that schizophrenia may be associated with de
novo mutations in paternal germ cells (Malaspina et al., 2001).
Quantitative measures of the genetic contribution to schizophrenia are controversial. The
largest twin study to date looking at heritability of schizophrenia found a concordance rate of
33% in monozygotic twins and 7% in dizygotic twins (Hilker, 2018). Based on this information,
the estimated heritability of schizophrenia is 79%; after separating out spectrum disorders that
include schizophrenia the estimate for residual cases is lowered to 73% (Gejman, 2010 and
Hilker, 2018). Despite the relatively low concordance for monozygotic twins, one study found
that an individual with a positive family history of schizophrenia has a 10-fold increase in risk to
develop schizophrenia (Lu et al., 2017). The large difference between what researchers expect to
find based on twin studies and the combined genetic effect of known molecular risk factors is
called the “heritability gap” (Uher and Zwicker, 2017).

Figure 1. The heritability gap (Uher and Zwicker, 2017)
Studies examining copy number variation (CNV) and rare variants as risk factors have
provided insight into the genetics of schizophrenia. Current estimates show a lack of consensus,
suggesting that as low as 50% to as high as potentially 90% of the genetic risk for the disorder
comes from common polygenes (Kendler et. al., 2014). Alleles for these conditions often seem to
be de novo or recent in a family history, and these alleles can have an effect on either
neuroanatomical or behavioral traits, but expressivity is variable (Malhotra and Sebat, 2012).
There has also been research in predicting the development of schizophrenia based on an
individual’s genetics; at this time there is insufficient data to provide this type of predication.
While research has identified many genetic associations with schizophrenia, our inability to

determine what genetic variation is causative makes it impossible to predict the type or severity
of symptoms in an individual. This uncertainty has not stopped the use of genetic evidence and
discussions regarding liability in court.

METHODS
Recruitment
State trial court judges were randomly chosen from The American Bench, a publicly
available list of judges nationwide currently sitting on the bench. Demographic information was
collected from the judges including sex (Male, Female), race (White, Black or African American,
Asian, Other), and race summarized (Non-Hispanic White, Non-White).
No compensation was offered to participants, as judges are government employees.
Participants were recruited from April 18th, 2019 to July 8th, 2019 through collaboration with the
Center for Survey Research (CSR), an academic survey research center housed by the University
of Massachusetts in Boston. CSR identified and recruited participants through The American
Bench, a publicly available nationwide listing of over 20,000 judges, including state trial court
judges. CSR drew a sampling of judges to participate in the study.
Judges with an email address on file were contacted by this method with a link to the
survey. Non-responders received two email reminders, after which they were sent a hard paper
package. Judges without an email address on file were contacted through the post and given both
a link to the survey online and a paper survey with a postage-paid envelope. A second packet
followed the initial mailing to non-responders after three weeks. Those completing the survey
online provided electronic consent. The paper survey included an invitation letter that served as
consent disclosure and the return of the completed survey was deemed as an indication for
consent. Survey participants were de-identified and their identities were unknown to the research

team. The study was approved by the New York State Psychiatric Institute’s Institutional Review
Board.

Survey
The survey consisted of a 2-page hypothetical tort case with variants. In both versions, a
30-year-old man named John begins having auditory hallucinations that he is a “supreme being
who had the power to save the world.” These hallucinations and delusions resulted in John
causing an automobile accident, which was randomized to reflect either battery or negligence. In
the battery scenario, John initiated the crash, as he believed the oncoming truck was sent to
destroy him. In the negligence scenario, John was distracted by auditory hallucinations, which
lead to his car crashing into the oncoming truck. These scenarios were randomized for
participants. The independent variables are the presence or absence of genetic evidence and
whether or not John experienced a prior psychiatric episode. Dependent variables included views
of danger, responsibility, and liability, among others. This survey was expected to take
participants a maximum of 20 minutes to complete. Participants were then asked questions to
determine, on the basis of the facts provided, their views on the case and how it should be
resolved. Areas explored included if John was civilly responsible, a danger to the public, had
control of his actions, and was capable of adult responsibilities. Another question asked the
factors that caused John’s situation. Demographic questions included the following: age, sex,
race, degrees, tort workload, length of judge position, geographical location, and political views.

RESULTS
Demographics
There were 465 surveys submitted by judges, 234 completed the battery scenario and 231
completed the negligence scenario. The majority of judges self-identified as Male (72%) and

Non-Hispanic White (83%). Further demographic information can be found in Table 1. 78.2% of
the judges reported that their workload included tort cases, with a higher percentage (82.0%) in
respondents who had the battery scenario compared to the negligence scenario (74.5%).
Demographic
Area

Response

Sex

Race

Race
Summarized

Male

Overall
(N = 465)
n (%)
335 (72.0)

Scenario:
Battery
(n = 234)
172 (73.5)

Scenario:
Negligence
(n = 231)
163 (70.6)

Female

130 (28.0)

62 (26.5)

68 (29.4)

White

402 (88.6)

206 (89.2)

200 (88.1)

Black or African American

34 (7.4)

15 (6.5)

19 (8.4)

Asian

8 (1.7)

5 (2.2)

3 (1.3)

Other

10 (2.2)

5 (2.2)

5 (2.2)

Non-Hispanic White

386 (83.0)

197 (84.2)

189 (81.8)

Non-White

79 (17.0)

37 (15.8)

42 (18.2)

Table 1. Respondent’s demographic information.

Civil Responsibility for Negligence or Battery
After reading the vignette, over half of the judges found John civilly responsible for his
behavior, specifically 51.8% in the battery case and 67.5% in the negligence case. In addition,
over half (56.1%) of the judges who read the negligence scenario found the defendant’s
schizophrenia as a biological disorder qualifying as a physical disability.
In the negligence scenario, responses were not impacted by genetic evidence; however,
responses were impacted by the presence or absence of a prior psychiatric episode. When given
information about a prior psychiatric episode, 75.2% of respondents found John to be civilly
responsible of negligence. In the absence of a prior psychiatric episode, this percentage decreased
to 58.3%, a statistically significant difference (p = 0.007). Non-Hispanic White participants were
more likely to find John to be civilly responsible of negligence (70%) than Non-White Judges
(53.7%), which is statistically significant (p = 0.036).

Danger to the Public
The majority (67.6%) of all participants agreed that John is dangerous to the public,
including 76.1% who received the battery case and 58.6% who received negligence case. In the
battery scenario, the presence or absence of genetic evidence impacted responses about John’s
dangerousness. In the presence of genetic evidence, 83% of respondents agreed that John was
dangerous to the public. In the absence of genetic evidence, this percentage decreased to 69.5%
(p=0.016).

Control of Actions
Over half of the judges (61.8%) disagreed with the statement, “John had control over his
actions.” including of 64.6% who reviewed the battery scenario and 59.0% who reviewed the
negligence scenario. Male respondents (41.4%) were more likely than Female respondents
(29.5%) to agree that John had control over his actions in both scenarios (p=0.026). In the
negligence scenario, 47.6% of Male respondents agreed John had control over his actions
compared to only 25.4% of Female respondents (p= 0.003). Race also demonstrated a significant
effect, with 40.4% of Non-Hispanic White respondents agreeing that John had control over his
actions compared to 26.2% of Non-White Respondents (p=0.03).

Causation
Table 2 shows the overwhelming majority of judges indicated John’s situation was likely
caused by a chemical imbalance or genetics, and only a minority indicated John’s situation was
likely caused by the way he was raised or bad character. The presence or absence of genetic
information, a prior psychiatric episode, and the gender identity of the respondent impacted
responses.

Overall, in the presence of genetic evidence, 90.3% of respondents indicated John’s
situation was likely caused by a chemical imbalance in his brain, regardless of the scenario. In the
absence of genetic evidence, this percentage increased to 97.2%. This response was statistically
significant with a p-value of 0.002. In the presence of genetic evidence in the battery case, 89.4%
of respondents indicated John’s situation was likely caused by a chemical imbalance in his brain.
In the absence of genetic evidence in the battery case, this percentage increased to 98.3%. This
response was statistically significant with a p-value of 0.005. In the battery scenario, 88.7% of
Female respondents and 95.9% of Male respondents indicated it was likely that chemical
imbalance in John’s brain was the cause of the situation, with a p-value of 0.041. The presence of
genetic evidence did not significantly impact the responses.
Other statistically significant responses for the causation question included John’s
upbringing as a cause to his situation. In the presence of genetic evidence, 11.2% of all
respondents indicated John’s situation was likely caused by the way he was raised. In the absence
of genetic evidence, this percentage decreased to 4.9%. This response was statistically significant
with a p-value of 0.012. In the presence of genetic evidence in the battery case, 14.3% of
respondents indicated John’s situation was likely caused by the way he was raised. In the absence
of genetic evidence in the battery case, this percentage decreased to 4.2%. This response was
statistically significant with a p-value of 0.01. In the negligence case, genetic evidence did not
have a significant impact on respondents’ view of John’s situation being caused by his
upbringing. In the presence of genetic evidence, 7.8% of respondents indicated John’s situation
was likely caused by the way he was raised, compared to 5.6% in the absence of genetic evidence
(p=0.488).
In the negligence scenario, only Female respondents (3%) indicated John’s own bad
character likely caused his situation, with a p-value of 0.026. In the presence of a prior psychiatric
episode in the battery case, 98.5% of respondents indicated John’s situation was likely caused by
a genetic or inherited problem. In the absence of a psychiatric episode in the battery case, this

percentage decreased to 92.9%. This response was statistically significant with a p-value of
0.037.
The last set of statistically significant responses for this causation question included
stressful circumstances in John’s life. In the presence of genetic evidence in the negligence
scenario, 39.6% of respondents indicated John’s situation was likely caused by stressful
circumstances in his life. In the absence of genetic evidence, this percentage increased to 52.8%.
This response was statistically significant with a p-value of 0.048.

How likely is it that John’s
situation is caused by each of
the following?
a. The way he was raised

Response

Somewhat likely / Very
likely
Not at all likely / Not very
likely
b. Stressful circumstances in his Somewhat likely / Very
life
likely
Not at all likely / Not very
likely
c. A chemical imbalance in his
Somewhat likely / Very
brain
likely
Not at all likely / Not very
likely
d. A genetic or inherited
Somewhat likely / Very
problem
likely
Not at all likely / Not very
likely
e. His own bad character
Somewhat likely / Very
likely
Not at all likely / Not very
likely
Table 2. Respondent’s views on the cause of John’s situation.

Overall
(N = 465)
n (%)
36
(7.8)
424
(92.2)
235
(51.6)
220
(48.4)
434
(93.9)
28
(6.1)
450
(96.8)
15
(3.2)
6
(1.3)
454
(98.7)

Scenario:
Battery
(n = 234)
21
(9.1)
211
(90.9)
129
(56.3)
100
(43.7)
219
(94.0)
14
(6.0)
225
(96.2)
9
(3.8)
4
(1.7)
228
(98.3)

Scenario:
Negligence
(n = 231)
15
(6.6)
213
(93.4)
106
(46.9)
120
(53.1)
215
(93.9)
14
(6.1)
225
(97.4)
6
(2.6)
2
(0.9)
226
(99.1)

Capabilities
Another question in the survey, (See Table 3) asked judges their perception of John’s
capabilities. Over 85% of respondents indicated John was capable of making marital decisions,
opening a new bank account, signing a contract involving a financial transaction, and providing

testimony in court proceedings. 78.2% of all respondents indicated John was capable of making a
decision to receive psychiatric treatment, whereas 61.8% indicated he was capable to refuse
psychiatric treatment. Specifically in the battery scenario, 88.9% of non-white respondents
indicated John was capable of making a decision to receive psychiatric treatment compared to
72.3% of Non-Hispanic White respondents, with a p-value of 0.037. In the battery scenario, all
Non-White Respondents indicated John was capable of opening a new bank account compared to
89.7% of Non-Hispanic White respondents, with a p-value of 0.05.
In the presence of genetic evidence, 92.5% of all respondents indicated John was capable
of making marital decisions, compared to 85.7% in the absence of genetic evidence. This
response was statistically significant with a p-value of 0.02. Specifically in the battery scenario,
92.7% of participants that were presented with genetic evidence indicated John was capable,
compared to 82.5% in the absence of genetic evidence with a p-value of 0.02.
In the presence of genetic evidence, 90.7% of all respondents indicated John was capable
of signing a contract involved in financial transaction, compared to 83.2% in the absence of
genetic evidence. This response was statistically significant with a p-value of 0.018. Specifically
in the negligence scenario, 90.4% of participants that were presented with genetic evidence
thought John was capable, compared to 82.3% in the absence of genetic evidence with a p-value
of 0.078. In the presence of a psychiatric episode, 90.8% of respondents indicated John was
capable, compared to 81.3% in the absence of a psychiatric episode, with a p-value of 0.003.
Specifically in the battery case, 91.1% of participants that were presented with a psychiatric
episode thought John was capable, compared to 82.3% in the absence of a psychiatric episode
with a p-value of 0.046. Specifically in the negligence case, 90.5% of participants that were
presented with a psychiatric episode indicated John was capable, compared to 80.4% in the
absence of a psychiatric episode with a p-value of 0.029.
In the presence of genetic evidence, 94% of respondents indicated John was capable of
providing a testimony in court proceedings, compared to 86.4% in the absence of genetic

evidence. This response was statistically significant with a p-value of 0.007. Specifically in the
battery scenario, 93.7% of participants that were presented with genetic evidence indicated John
was capable, compared to 82.5% in the absence of genetic evidence with a p-value of 0.009. In
the presence of a psychiatric episode, 93.1% of respondents indicated John was capable,
compared to 85.7% in the absence of a psychiatric episode, with a p-value of 0.009. Specifically
in the negligence case, 90.6% of participants that were presented with a psychiatric episode
thought John was capable, compared to 87% in the absence of a psychiatric episode with a pvalue of 0.024.
In the presence of genetic evidence in the negligence case, 76% of respondents indicated
John was capable of making a decision to refuse psychiatric treatment, compared to 58.9% in the
absence of genetic evidence. This response was statistically significant with a p-value of 0.006.

How capable is John of doing
each of the following?

Response

a. Making marital decisions
(e.g. divorce, remarry)

Somewhat capable / Very capable

b. Opening a new bank account

c. Owning property (e.g. a car
or apartment)
d. Signing a contract involving
a financial transaction

e. Providing testimony in court
proceedings

f. Making a decision to receive
psychiatric treatment

g. Making a decision to refuse
psychiatric treatment

Capability Score

Overall
(N = 465)
n (%)
407 (88.9)

Scenario:
Battery
(n = 234)
201 (87.4)

Scenario:
Negligence
(n = 231)
206 (90.4)

Not at all capable / Not very
capable

51 (11.1)

29 (12.6)

22 (9.6)

Somewhat capable / Very capable

424 (92.4)

211 (91.3)

213 (93.4)

Not at all capable / Not very
capable

35 (7.6)

20 (8.7)

15 (6.6)

Somewhat capable / Very capable

424 (92.4)

213 (92.2)

211 (92.5)

Not at all capable / Not very
capable
Somewhat capable / Very capable

35 (7.6)

18 (7.8)

17 (7.5)

398 (86.7)

202 (87.4)

196 (86.0)

Not at all capable / Not very
capable

61 (13.3)

29 (12.6)

32 (14.0)

Somewhat capable / Very capable

411 (89.9)

203 (87.9)

208 (92.0)

Not at all capable / Not very
capable

46 (10.1)

28 (12.1)

18 (8.0)

Somewhat capable / Very capable

359 (78.2)

173 (74.9)

186 (81.6)

Not at all capable / Not very
capable

100 (21.8)

58 (25.1)

42 (18.4)

Somewhat capable / Very capable

283 (61.8)

131 (57.0)

152 (66.7)

Not at all capable / Not very
capable

175 (38.2)

99 (43.0)

76 (33.3)

Mean (SD)

12.90 (1.77)

12.77
(1.87)

13.04
(1.66)

Table 3. Respondent’s views on John’s capability of various tasks and decisions.

DISCUSSION
The impact of behavioral genetic evidence on sentencing has been explored in criminal
law literature, however the relationship between behavioral genetic evidence and responsibility
for behavior in tort litigation has not, therefore this study is the first to analyze this relationship.
Based on the results of this study, judges’ impressions and understanding of genetics and

schizophrenia have the potential to contribute to their decision-making and views. Over half the
judges surveyed indicated that they would find John civilly responsible for the outcome of his
behavior, regardless of whether they read a scenario of negligence or battery. Genetic evidence
was found to have no impact on perspectives of reasonability in both scenarios.
Additionally, our findings indicate that having a documented prior psychiatric episode
impacts how judges view the etiology of psychiatric conditions. In the battery scenario, the
presence of a previous psychiatric episode led more judges to agree that John’s situation was
likely caused by a genetic or inherited problem, indicating that intractability and severity, as
defined by multiple psychiatric episodes, is associated with a genetic explanation. How judges
interpret genetic information for conditions like schizophrenia can potentially play a large role in
their decision-making, however the results of this study did not support this idea. Their mindset
impacts how judges view an affected individual’s responsibility for his or her actions and
behavior, and has future implications for the extent to which genetic attribution for psychiatric
conditions may affect what are considered physical disabilities in civil court.

Whether or Not Genetic Evidence Impacts Notions of Responsibility for Behavior
The genetic evidence offered in the survey and current stigma surrounding schizophrenia
did not greatly affect judges’ decision making in this study. The features of psychotic illness fall
along a continuous spectrum and include symptoms such as delusions, hallucinations,
disorganized thinking and speech, and abnormal motor behavior (Kapur et al., 2012 and Kendler
et al., 2014). All these features could potentially play a role in an individual’s level of
responsibility, although not in tort law at this time. Though researchers are not certain of one
specific genetic cause for schizophrenia, the current overarching understanding is that the
condition is genetic, partially heritable, and most likely due to an underlying multifactorial cause,
which includes genetic risk factors, environment, gene-environment interactions, and more
(Tandon, 2013). With 96.8% of judges indicating it was somewhat likely or very likely John’s

situation is caused by a genetic or inherited problem, our study demonstrates a belief in the idea
that schizophrenia is something that John was born with, rather than acquired.
Surprisingly, a correlation was found between introducing evidence of genetic attribution
and judges’ assumptions about John’s upbringing. When evidence of genetic attribution was
presented, judges were more likely to think John’s upbringing had a role in his behavior in the
battery scenario. We had anticipated the opposite, hypothesizing that judges would be
increasingly likely to dismiss environmental factors in the face of biological attribution.
In a future study, it would be interesting to explore how genetic evidence may alter
judges’ decision making in terms of compensation for injuries or damages in civil court. In the
battery scenario, judges were more likely to describe John as dangerous in the presence of
evidence suggestive of genetic attribution. However, it is unclear how such views may affect the
level of compensation that judges may order. In a study examining the link between an official
diagnosis and criminal sentencing, researchers found a contrasting result where a diagnosis
resulted in an overall reduced punishment from the surveyed judges, lessening the sentence from
13.93 years to 12.83 years (Aspinwall et al., 2012). It would be intriguing to explore whether this
concern will play out differently in tort litigation, namely: whether the impact of genetic
information on perceptions of dangerousness would result in higher or reduced compensations.

How the Use of Psychiatric Genetic Information May Impact Our Understanding of Psychiatric
Conditions as Physical Disabilities
As more research is conducted on the topic of psychiatric conditions, the way in which
we define physical disabilities may change. In the presence of genetic evidence in both the battery
and negligence scenarios, the vast majority of respondents agreed that John’s situation was likely
caused by a chemical imbalance. This could imply that the majority of judges might equate
evidence of genetic attribution with a chemical imbalance, a factor out of his control. However,
even in the absence of genetic evidence, a vast majority (97.2%) of judges answered somewhat

likely or very likely due to a chemical imbalance in his brain, so apparently this is broadly
indicative of how these judges view schizophrenia. If an individual is born with a predisposition
to a genetic condition that creates a chemical imbalance in their brain, this could be viewed as a
congenital disability. Even if acquired during their lifetime, this could also be viewed as a
physical disability, as a disability is defined as any condition that makes it more difficult for a
person to do certain activities or interact with the world around them. Schizophrenia, by the
nature of the disorder, falls under this definition.
Among those who read the negligence scenario, over half of the judges agreed that John’s
schizophrenia was a biological disorder qualifying as a physical disability. Disabilities fall on a
wide spectrum (cognitive, intellectual, developmental, mental, physical, sensory) and may
include a combination of multiple aspects, and all should be seen as valid factors when
determining responsibility. Though this kind of evidence is relatively new and more limited to
criminal cases, predispositions to genetic conditions (i.e. MAOA deficiency cases) are being
presented in court to determine levels of responsibility for an individual’s behavior. In the future,
genetic and chemical changes may be more clearly defined as physical disabilities by legal
precedent. Having a clearer definition of what is considered a disability would allow for major
changes in policy regarding how these individuals are treated in court.

Limitations of the Study
One area of limitations of this study is within the literature. There is an abundance of data
on the possible genetics of schizophrenia; however, there is a lack of concordance in the scientific
community. This study shed light on how judges view genetic evidence when making decisions,
but there is a lack of concrete data on the cause(s) and etiology of schizophrenia. While it is
possible that a study design that centered around a psychiatric condition with high genetic validity
(e.g., Huntington’s Disease) would have had more impact on judicial decisions, our description of
“a combination of genes that, … makes it more likely that a person will have schizophrenia”

better fits with existing knowledge and we preferred it over a deterministic evidence that is
unsupported by scientific research that could confuse participants and increase biases. An
additional limitation of this study was a lack of understanding of judges’ knowledge of key issues
in genetics such as etiology, inheritance patterns, and penetrance of features, which may have
influenced their responses. However, given the challenges in recruiting judges—a hard to reach
population—we opted for a first survey to be experimental in nature, without risking participants’
dropping out due to the possible discomfort of showing insufficient genetic literacy.
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